Syquia v Almeda (Doctrine of State Immunity)

DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY Syquia v Almeda Facts: The plaintiffs are the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings in the City of Manila known as the North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. Plaintiffs requested the defendants to renegotiate said leases, execute lease contract for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those payable under the old contracts, but defendants refused. Because of the alleged representation and assurance that the U.S. Government would vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly rentals tendered by the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman on the basis of a month to month lease subject to cancellation upon thirty days notice. The plaintiffs commenced the present action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for unlawful detainer (desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64 persons occupying apartments in the three buildings for the purpose of having them vacate the apartments, each occupants to pay P300 a month for his particular apartment from January 1, 1947 until each of said particular defendant had vacated said apartment; Acting upon a motion to dismiss filed through the Special Assistant of the Judge Advocate, Philippine Ryukus Command on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action, because the real party in interest was the U.S. Government and not the individual defendants named in the complaint, and that the complaint did not state a cause of action, the municipal court of Manila in an order dated April 29, 1947, found that the war between the United States of America and her allies on one side and Germany and Japan on the other, had not yet terminated and, consequently, the period or term of the three leases had not yet expired. Issue: conflicts arise between Filipino civilian property owners and the U.S. Army authorities concerning contracts entered into in the Philippines between said Filipinos and the U.S. Government. Consequently, this Court, according to the petitioners, far from dismissing the case, should decide it, particularly the question of jurisdiction. Held that under the well settled rule of International Law, a foreign government like the United States Government cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its consent; that it was clear from the allegations of the complaint that although the United States of America has not been named therein as defendant, it is nevertheless the real defendant in this case, as the parties named as defendants are officers of the United States Army and were occupying the buildings in question as such and pursuant to orders received from that Government. The municipal court dismissed the action with costs against the plaintiffs with the suggestion or opinion that a citizen of the Philippines, who feels aggrieved by the acts of the Government of a foreign country has the right to demand that the Philippine Government study his claim and if found meritorious, take such diplomatic steps as may be necessary for the vindication of rights of that citizen, and that the matter included or involved in the action should be a proper subject matter of representations between the Government of the Government of the United States of America and the Philippines. Not being satisfied with the order, plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Manila, where the motion to dismiss was renewed. The Court of First Instance of Manila in an order dated July 12, 1947, affirmed the order of the municipal court dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. It conceded that under the doctrine laid down in the case of U. S. vs. Lee, 106 U. S., 196 and affirmed in the case of Tindal vs. Wesley, 167 U. S., 204 ordinarily, courts have jurisdiction over cases where private parties sue to recover possession of property being held by officers or agents acting in the name of the U. S. Government even though no suit can be brought against the Government itself, but inasmuch as the plaintiffs in the present case are bringing this action against officers and agents of the U. S. Government not only to recover the possession of the three apartment houses supposedly being held illegally by them in the name of their government, but also to collect back rents, not only at the rate agreed upon in the lease contracts entered into by the United States of America but in excess of said rate, to say nothing of the damages claimed, as a result of which, a judgment in these proceedings may become a charge against the U. S. Treasury, then under the rule laid down in the case of Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law. ed., 1209, the present suit must be regarded as one against the United States Government itself, which cannot be sued without its consent, specially by citizens of another country.